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I. INTRODUCTION
The letter of invitation to this conference described it as designed to
contribute to a "renewed debate in the last several years on how best to
promote development in an era of globalization." It also identified three
critical components in this debate: development assistance in support of
the so-called Millennium Development Goals (MDG), trade liberalization
for improving access to industrial country markets for developing
* Samuel C. Park, Jr. Professor of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Con-
necticut USA. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the "Globalization, Law &
Development" Conference at University of Michigan Law School during April 16-18, 2004. I
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countries, and institutional reforms, in particular, development assistance
towards building effective and corruption-free government.
Each of these critical components is problematic. First, declarations
such as MDG, the Monterrey Declaration on Development Finance, or
the Right to Development are rhetorical and hortatory and have only lim-
ited operational significance. Second, although greater access to
industrial country markets, and a rule-based and transparent global sys-
tem of trade and finance that guarantees such access to developing
countries are important, the real issue is not the recognition of their im-
portance, but the political economy of ensuring the existence of both.
Progress in this regard depends largely, though not wholly, on the United
States, the European Union, Japan, and other industrial countries. With-
out their willingness to dismantle their protective barriers and
agricultural export subsidies in the Doha Round of trade negotiations,
not much progress can be expected. Third, the potency of development
assistance as a lever to bring about sustainable reforms (not only eco-
nomic, but socio-political-institutional) is overrated, not least because
such assistance from the West has gone in the past to many odious re-
gimes as a reward for their support in the Cold War. Last, ignoring the
tremendous variance across developing countries in their stages of their
economic, social, and political development and treating them as an un-
differentiated group of "Third World" or "developing" countries in
discussing market access or assistance is an invitation to avoid critical
thinking.
Many of the needed changes in policy, the political economy of
making them, and, above all, the changes in polity, society, and institu-
tions to promote development are domestic. In all countries there are
usually vested interests in the status quo that would resist change. It
would ill serve the objective of promoting development to focus exces-
sively, if not exclusively, on the external dimension. Given the diversity
among the developing countries, advice on their domestic policy must
necessarily allow for their particular context. At the same time, in doing
so one should not fall into the trap of viewing every country as sui
generis, thus assuming that no general principles and prescriptions rele-
vant for many or most countries exist. Indeed, such principles do exist.
For example, one of the important domestic institutions of a country that
has both an intrinsic value and instrumental role in promoting (or retard-
ing) development is its legal system, both in a de jure or formal set of
laws, rules, and case-laws, and in a defacto sense of its functioning, spe-
cifically its enforcement and its efficiency, both of which are invariably
country-specific. It is indeed appropriate that this conference has focused
on legal issues.
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In what follows, I first discuss the process of development in Section
II. Section III is devoted to the external aspects of development, namely
international trade, finance, and intergovernmental organizations. Sec-
tion IV is concerned with the domestic dimensions and legal reform,
drawing on the debate on legal reforms in India. I offer a few concluding
remarks in Section V.
II. THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT
In thinking about how best to promote development, it is instructive
to recall that until the emergence of in the late nineteenth century of neo-
classical economics, the focus of which is static equilibrium, all of
economics was development economics, with its focus on "dynamics of
growth and development. Adam Smith's theme was the wealth of na-
tions" and the factors that promoted wealth accumulation. Marx, of
course, pursued the grand theme of theory and evolution of capitalism in
history. The last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decade or
so of the twentieth century saw the first wave of globalization, the char-
acteristics of which were eloquently described and whose abrupt end as
the First World War broke out was bemoaned by no less a person than
Keynes.' The inter-war period was disastrous from the perspective of the
global economy, characterized as it was by rising protectionism, collapse
of global capital markets, and, of course, the Great Depression. It is no
surprise that economists were more concerned about unemployment and
idle capacity than about static equilibrium or of grand dynamics of de-
velopment. It is only in the closing years of the Second World War, at
which time arose the problems of reconstruction of war-damaged
economies and development of poor countries in anticipation of their
becoming independent nations, that the problem of development began
to draw attention from economists. In this section, I discuss the emer-
gence of development economics as a distinct discipline and how the
pioneers of development economics viewed the goals, content, and proc-
ess of development. Their diagnosis of the causes of underdevelopment
and their experience of the disastrous inter-war period led them to pro-
pose development strategies which, in many ways, turned out to be
inappropriate to the realities of the world economy of the post-Second
World War era. I review the experience with these strategies that empha-
sized state-directed industrialization based on import substitution in the
four decades or so after the end of the Second World War and the main
lessons from this experience. These lessons emphasized the efficiency of
1. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE (1919).
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the market mechanism, the importance of openness to external trade and
investment, and, above all, the creation and strengthening of institutions
that are essential for successful development.
A. The Emergence of Development Economics
Scholars of disciplines besides economics, such as anthropology and
political science, have enriched the academic analysis of development.
Still, as an economist myself, I am most familiar with and comfortable in
discussing economists' perceptions and analyses of development. Devel-
opment economics as a subdiscipline branched off from mainstream
economics during the final years of the Second World War. Until the ad-
vent of neoclassical economics in the late nineteenth century, all of
economics was development economics. Classical economists such as
Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and their predecessors were
concerned with issues of economic development. The pre-Second World
War neoclassicists, with the exception of Allyn Young whose classic ar-
ticle was entitled "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress," paid
virtually no attention to problems of growth or of development of poor
countries.2 Neoclassical resurgence in development economics is strictly
a post-war phenomenon.
B. Goals and Content of Development
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) asserts
that:
[e]conomic growth became the main focus after the Second
World War and the growth rate of the gross national product be-
came the goal of development in the 1950s and 1960s, the
question of promoting individual well-being receded. In time
distribution was altogether forgotten.. .. [T]hus income moved
from an admittedly partial measure of well-being to center stage
as a measure of production and as the sole measure of welfare in
per capita form. By the 1960s it was clear from many developing
countries that income growth had not tackled the problem of
mass poverty. Income distribution and equity came to the fore-
front as an additional objective of development.3
The most charitable characterization of this assertion is that it is based
on a misreading of the history of development thinking and policy. This
is not to say, of course, that occasionally development and growth of in-
2. Allyn A. Young, Increasing Returns and Economic Progress, 38 ECON. J. 527, 527-
42 (1928).
3. UNDP; HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990 104 (1990).
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Development
come per head were treated as synonymous. Interestingly, the Nobel
Laureate Jan Tinbergen, a sage among economists, in a section entitled
"Ultimate Aims Pursued" in his celebrated little book The Design of De-
velopment, states the general principle that one should maximize the
contribution of an investment program to the country's 
"well-being. ' 4
"Well-being" may be taken to mean national income, present and future,
with possible corrections for distribution over social groups or regions .
Buchanan and Ellis, authors of an early textbook on development,
distinguished between indicators that in their view portrayed the quality
and texture of life as an "end-product" and others that tended to proxy
economic performance and therefore to explain or at least correlate with
the end-product.6 Significantly, they included life expectancy at birth,
infant mortality, general health indicators, and food intake in the set of
indicators of end-product. They viewed "real income per person" simply
as a short-hand expression for all these indicators together. Arthur
Lewis, also a pioneer in development and another Nobel Laureate, ended
his magisterial The Theory of Economic Growth with a chapter entitled,
"Is Growth Desirable?"7 Thus, early development economists and, even
more importantly, policy-makers were very aware, long before UNDP
discovered it, that development is multidimensional and growth of per
capita income had an important instrumental role in promoting devel-
opment rather than being solely a measure of development success or
failure.
In India, as early as 1938, the Indian National Congress, the domi-
nant political party then fighting for national independence, appointed a
committee under the chairmanship of the future Prime Minister Nehru to
plan for the development of independent India. Nehru recalled later:
Obviously we could not consider any problem, much less plan,
without some definite aim and social objective. That aim was
declared to be to insure an adequate standard of living for the
masses; in other words to get rid of the appalling poverty of the
people.... [T]here was lack of food, of clothing, of housing and
every other requirement of human existence. To remove this lack
and insure an irreducible minimum standard for everybody, the
national income had to be greatly increased, and in addition...
there had to be a more equitable distribution of wealth.8
4. JAN TINBERGEN, THE DESIGN OF DEVELOPMENT 36 (1952).
5. Id.
6. NORMAN S. BUCHANAN & HOWARD S. ELLIS, APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT 7 (1955).
7. W. ARTHUR LEWIS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1955).
8. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, THE DISCOVERY OF INDIA 402 (1946) (emphasis added).
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In a widely cited book, the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen defined de-
velopment as a "process of expanding the real freedoms that people
enjoy," contrasting with what he called "narrower views of development,
such as development with the growth of gross national product, or with
the rise in personal incomes or with industrialization or with technologi-
cal advance, or with social modernization." 9 He suggests that "viewing
development in terms of expanding substantive freedoms directs atten-
tion to the ends that make development important, rather than merely
means that, inter alia, play a prominent part in process."'
The distinction between ends and means and the related one between
intrinsic and instrumental values are well understood. What is less well
understood is that, as in logical systems in which "there is a certain free-
dom of choice as to which statements one wishes to regard as premises,
and which ones as derived implications,"'" there is often some freedom
of choice or an element of arbitrariness in what one deems an end as op-
posed to means. For example, universal primary education could be
viewed as an end in itself or as a means to the end of informed participa-
tion of all citizens in the socio-economic-political processes of a nation.
Besides, in some situations, an end could also be a means for achieving
another end. Be that as it may, expansion of substantive freedoms as an
end or goal is implicit in the writings some policy makers such as Jawa-
harlal Nehru. Sen's characterization of development, and more
importantly his identification of major sources of lack of freedom, rein-
force one of the main points of this paper that the constraints on
development are largely domestic.
Last, there is the concept of a right to development adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1986. This is not the occasion to
explore whether it has any content and, if it does, whether it or human
rights more broadly conceived provide a normative framework for think-
ing about institutions, including legal systems, for development. Sen
devotes Chapter 10 of his book to human rights. He identifies three
broad critiques to the human rights approach-a legitimacy critique (a
confounding of the consequences of legal systems with pre-legal princi-
ples), a coherence critique (rights do not mean much as long as there is
no agency that has the duty to provide such rights), and a cultural cri-
tique (there are no universal values underpinning the rights)-only to
argue against the significance of the critiques. I did not find his argu-
9. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (1999).
10. Id.
11. TJALLING KOOPMANS, The Interaction of Tools and Problems in Economics, in
THREE ESSAYS ON THE STATE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 169, 183 (1957).
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ments, particularly the ones against legitimacy and coherence critiques,
persuasive. 
2
C. Diagnosis of the Causes of Underdevelopment
In their analysis of the reasons why many countries had not devel-
oped, most of the early development economists started from a
presumption that there was a large surplus of rural labor with low marginal
productivity, and industrialization was the key to absorb this surplus in
more productive activities. 3 The process of industrialization in their view
was constrained on the demand side by lack of domestic demand and on
the supply side by shortage of physical capital. Additionally, the process
was rife with externalities, indivisibilities, and scale economies. These in
turn meant that spontaneous industrialization through private initiatives
responding to market signals would not come about. Thus the State had
to play a major role in the process, and this role involved regulation of
the market economy through controls on prices, production, credit, and
domestic and foreign trade. Complementarities between industries on the
supply as well as demand sides meant that, in an economy largely closed
to foreign trade, "balanced" investment in a number of activities simul-
taneously had to be planned and, because of indivisibilities, the quantum
of investment had to be large.
The prospects for foreign trade were seen to be limited for two rea-
sons. First, traditional exports of primary products could be increased
only by increasing cost, because their prices were relative to those of
imports. For example, the terms of trade were believed to be declining
secularly. Second, demand for nontraditional exports of simple manufac-
tures was restricted by trade barriers erected by industrialized countries,
and supply was limited by the lack of industrial capacity and infrastruc-
ture in developing countries. Only industrialization based on substituting
domestic production would ease the constraints of domestic demand and
foreign exchange.
12. For example, in dismissing the legitimacy critique Sen argues that human rights are
best seen as a set of ethical claims that must not be identified with legislated legal rights, and
that their plausibility should be judged as a basis of ethical reasoning and as the basis of
political demands. Clearly, the legitimacy critique is not about human rights as the basis for
ethical reasoning (i.e., pre-legal principles), but rather about their status as entitlements
sanctioned by law. Sen also dismisses the coherence critique on the ground that human rights
are rights shared by all regardless of citizenship, the benefits of which rights everyone should
have. It seems odd to claim that everyone should have a benefit, while it is not the duty of
anyone to ensure that everyone does indeed enjoy that benefit.
13. See ARTHUR LEwis, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1955); Paul N. Rosen-
stein-Rodan, The Problem of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, 53
ECON. J. 202-11 (1943), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (A. N. Agar-
wala & S. R Singh eds., 1958).
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Although there were early reasoned critiques of this paradigm by
Gottfried Haberler, Jacob Viner, Theodore Schultz, and Peter Bauer, it
nonetheless became the dominant paradigm among not only develop-
ment economists in the academy but also international organizations
such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Tinbergen characterized the State or government
of an economy desirous of achieving sustained development as one en-
gaged in "activity of the sort usually considered essential to an orderly
state such as the maintenance of order and physical security of persons
and property." In addition, there must be a minimum of "instruments of
economic policy in the hands of the government, and these must be
properly used."' 4 Presumably because he conceived of most governments
in the image of the Dutch government, he must have assumed that the
State would be effective in its interventions in the economy and, above
all, that those in control of the apparatus of the State would behave like
Platonic guardians rather than as predators and would use it only to fur-
ther the interest of the governed.
D. Development Experience Since the End of
World War H and Its Lessons
1. Failure of the Dominant Paradigm
In contrast to the optimistic expectations of the originators of the
dominant paradigm, the actual development experience since the end of
the Second World War is decidedly mixed. Only a few countries (leaving
aside countries with less than a million in population in 1960) of East
and Southeast Asia, other than China, had achieved sustained and rapid
growth for more than three decades since the mid-sixties, and only until
some of them experienced a severe financial crisis in 1997. Interestingly,
although the crisis was in many ways devastating, barring Indonesia
(where the crisis was political as well as economic), other crisis-ridden
countries have since resumed their growth, albeit at a somewhat slower
rate relative to the pre-crisis era because of a global slowdown. In con-
trast:
African economic performance has been markedly worse than
that of other regions. During the 1980s, per capita GDP declined
by 1.3 percent p.a., a full 5 percentages points below the average
for all low-income developing countries. During 1990-94 the
14. TINBERGEN, supra note 4, at 4.
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decline accelerated to 1.8 percent p.a. and the gap widened to
6.2 percentage points.'5
In the final two decades of the twentieth century, China and India,
the world's two most populous countries with a combined total popula-
tion of 2.25 billion in 2000, enjoyed historically unprecedented average
annual rates of growth of GDP of around ten percent and six percent,
respectively.
From hindsight, it is clear that the dominant paradigm of state-
directed development was doomed to fail. The reason is that the "market
failure" perspective of the dominant paradigm, the "market friendly"
characterization of East Asian government interventions,
6 and the "mar-
ket enhancing" view of Aoki17 implicitly assume what Dixit calls a
"crude but effective caricature, 8 namely that policies are to be "made by
an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent dictator."'
9 Dixit suggests that
with the development of "second best" theory, which recognized that the
policy maker may be constrained from adopting first-best policies, his or
her "omnipotence" was removed. ° Once it is recognized that he or she
may not have, and may not even be able to acquire, the information
needed to design and implement optimal policies, "omniscience" was
removed. In spite of this, most normative policy analysis continues to
assume that the policy-maker is a benevolent dictator. Indeed, as Dixit
argues:
The implicit assumption is that once a policy that maximizes or
improves social welfare has been found and recommended, it
will be implemented as designed and the desired effects will fol-
low.
In reality, a policy proposal is merely the beginning of a process
that is political at every stage .... The political process of policy
making is constantly influenced by the legislature, the executive
and its agencies, the courts, various special interest lobbies, the
media, and so on. The legislature may fail to enact the econo-
mist's desired policies; the administrative process may fail to
implement the legislated policies in the intended manner. The
15. Paul Collier & Jan W. Gunning, Explaining African Economic Performance, 37 J.
OF ECON. LIT. 64, 64 (1999).
16. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991 61 (1991).
17. See THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT I (Masahiko Aoki
& Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara eds., 1997).
18. AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST
POLITICS PERSPECTIVE (MUNICH LECTURES) 8 (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 8, 9.
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outcomes may fail to correct market failures, and may instead
incur new costs of their own.2'
Although the leadership of many developing countries was initially
committed to development, partly as a consequence of the dominant role
of the State in the economy, over time political and administrative
corruption emerged and grew. The competition for aligning developing
countries to their side by protagonists of the Cold War exacerbated this
trend. In the context of civil wars and ethnic conflicts and poor policies,
development became a casualty in many parts of the world. Yet there
were some successes in development.
2. Lessons: Efficiency of Markets, Importance of
Openness and Institutions
Some lessons from these successes in development were obvious
and have already induced changes in development policies. Notably,
these lessons include the widespread recognition of the efficiency of the
market mechanism, the role of external trade and investment as engines
of growth and development, and, above all, the intrinsic and instrumental
values of participatory democracy. Most developing countries are en-
gaged in domestic reforms to remove state-created domestic
impediments in the functioning of markets. They are also globalizing,
that is, removing barriers to external trade and investments.
As the rise of the anti-globalization movement demonstrates, how-
ever, market-oriented reforms and globalization, though remarkably
successful in some developing countries (including the two giants of
China and India) in accelerating growth, have not succeeded everywhere.
I would argue that the successes as well as failures have much to do with
the existence and functioning of domestic institutions, both private and
public. The effectiveness of domestic institutions depends on their tack-
ling the basic problem identified by Dixit, namely, the possibility of
opportunistic behavior. These institutions include, importantly, legal in-
stitutions.
The role of institutions in development is best seen by viewing de-
velopment in the transactions perspective of Dixit22 and Williamson. 23 At
early stages of development, most households are largely self-sufficient,
and the few transactions they engage in consist of sporadic exchanges
through barter of a few goods and services. As development proceeds,
21. Id.
22. DixIT, supra note 18, at 31.
23. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Institutions and Governance of Economic Develop-
ment and Reform, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 1994 171 (1995).
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exchanges (using money as a medium of exchange) of an enormous
number of goods and services take place, regularly and repeatedly,
through markets in which the original producers (sellers) and the ulti-
mate users (buyers) may not, and often will not, be known to each other,
and with the quid and quo of exchanges being separated widely in time
and space.
With the separation of production and use, an important role for in-
termediation arises so that a class of traders and financial intermediaries
emerges who buy goods and services only to sell them at a different time
or place, rather than use them. Once intermediaries, whose sole interest
is in the return from price arbitrage (profits from buying low and selling
high) emerge, speculative activities also arise. It is not the existence of
markets per se - after all, markets have existed since antiquity - but it
is their scope, size, and sophistication that characterizes successful de-
velopment. While common in developed economies, efficient financial
and capital markets (that is, markets in which intertemporal transactions
involving saving, investing, borrowing, and lending take place, and in-
surance markets for transactions across uncertain states of nature)
function poorly or are nonexistent in developing countries. Also, the re-
lationship between markets and development runs both ways-as Adam
Smith noted long ago, increased specialization through division of labor,
a dominant characteristic of development, is limited by the size of the
market.
Exchanges in which the quid and the quo are widely separated in
time or space will not take place unless property rights are well defined
and contracts are enforced. Availability of reliable and inexpensively
acquired information, in particular about future conditions, facilitates
such exchanges. It is a clich6 to say that the three branches of the State
(executive, judiciary, and legislative) are crucial for determining what
property rights (and, more broadly, which laws) get enacted and what
contracts are admissible, how well laws and contracts are enforced, and
how efficiently disputes are settled, and so on. As Hilary Josephs notes,
however, in her review of a book on China's administrative law system:
[t]he fundamental flaw of the Chinese legal system by modem
international law standards is due to the absence of representa-
tive government. The laws cannot be considered the expression
of the popular will when the executive and legislative branches
of government are not accountable at the ballot box.2
24. Hilary K. Josephs, Foreign Investment in China: The Administrative Legal System,
32 INT'L LAW. 189, 192 (1998).
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Josephs is absolutely right that merely focusing on the failures of the
legal processes, such as the vagueness of laws and bureaucratic whims in
their enforcement, tends to obscure the basic problem of absence of rep-
resentative democracy. Her point is well taken that, in examining any
legal system, be it Chinese, Indian, or that of the United States, an atti-
tude "that laws will be self-executing with no element of judgment or
discretion in their implementation" and that there could be no "diver-
gence between theory and practice of law" is primitive and
unsophisticated by standards of contemporary legal scholarship."
III. EXTERNAL DIMENSION IN DEVELOPMENT
A. Trade Policy and Development: Analytical
and Empirical Evidence
Krueger points out that:
[i]deas with regard to trade policy and economic development
are among those that have changed radically. Then and now, it
was recognized that trade policy was central to the overall de-
sign of policies for economic development. But in the early
days, there was a broad consensus that trade policy should be
based on import substitution.... It was thought [that] import
substitution in manufactures would be synonymous with indus-
trialization, which in turn was seen as the key to development.26
She also noted how radically the different current thinking is by contrast.
It is now widely accepted that:
growth prospects for developing countries are greatly enhanced
through an out-oriented trade regime and fairly uniform incen-
tives (primarily through the exchange rate) for production across
exporting and import substituting goods ... It is generally be-
lieved that import substitution at a minimum outlived its
usefulness and liberalization of trade is crucial for both industri-
alization and economic development. While other policy
changes also are necessary, changing trade policy is among the
essential ingredients if there is to be hope for improved eco-
nomic performance. 7
25. Id. at 191-92.
26. Anne 0. Krueger, Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn, 87
Am. EcoN. REV. 1, 1 (1997).
27. Id. at 1.
There are some notable dissenters to this view, however, who claim
that "[t]he import substitution (IS) policies followed in much of the de-
veloping world until the 1980s were quite successful in some regards
and their costs have been vastly exaggerated,,
28 and that "IS worked
rather well for about two decades, [bringing] unprecedented economic
growth to scores of countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and
North Africa, and even to some in Sub-Saharan Africa.,
29 Even acknowl-
edging these dissenters, most development economists would share
Krueger's view.
The analytical arguments supporting the contribution of outward ori-
entation or globalization to economic growth and development are well
known. There are essentially three sources of economic growth: growth
in inputs of production; improvements in the efficiency of allocation of
inputs across economic activities; and innovation that creates new prod-
ucts, new uses for existing products, or brings about more efficient use
of inputs. Being open to trade and investment contributes to each of the
three sources of growth. Domestic resources are allocated more effi-
ciently when the economy can specialize in those activities in which it
has comparative advantage. By being open to capital, labor, and other
resource flows, an economy is able to augment relatively scarce domes-
tic resources and to use part of its abundant resources elsewhere where
they earn a higher return. Clearly, efficiency of resource use in each na-
tion and across the world is enhanced by the freedom of movement of
resources. Finally, the fruits of innovation anywhere in the world become
available everywhere in such an open world. Empirically demonstrating
these beneficial outcomes, however, is neither simple nor free of contro-
versy. Krueger based her conclusions on the number of comparative
country studies done in the 1970s and 1980s.
30
In recent years several cross-country regression studies
3 have
appeared purporting to assess the roles of trade openness, commitment
to rule of law, quality of institutions, human capital, income-inequality,
and so on, in explaining growth. One of the deft practitioners of this "all
but the kitchen sink" approach to the inclusion of explanatory variables
in a regression, Sala-i-Martin, even titled two of his articles, "I Just Ran
28. DANi RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAK-
ING OPENNESS WORK 64 (1999).
29. Id. at 99.
30. Krueger, supra note 26, at Sec. I, 14-17.
31. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Economic Reform and the Process
of Global Integration, in 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (1995); William East-
erly, Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?, 17 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 23, 23-48 (2003); Roland J.
M. Benabou, Inequality and Growth, in NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 11-73 (1996).
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Two Million Regressions" and "I Just Ran Four Million Regressions"!"
Jagdish Bhagwati and I have argued that one has to be skeptical for
many reasons of the findings of most of these regressions.33 There is no
theoretical reason to presume that data from many countries and over
several time periods all have been generated by the same stochastic
process specified by the common regression. Economic theory (and
political and institutional theories even more so) rarely specifies the
functional forms for the relations among variables, let alone the
probability distribution of the stochastic error terms of the regression. 4
Besides, the variables included in the regressions are almost always
empirical proxies (subject to conceptual differences, measurement
biases, and errors) of their counterparts in the theoretical model from
which the estimating equation is sometimes derived.
We concluded that nuanced, in-depth analyses of country experi-
ences in a comparative framework, taking into account numerous
country-specific factors such as those sponsored by the National Bureau
of Economic Research, OECD, and the World Bank in the 1960s and
1970s, were far more informative on openness to foreign trade than the
recent cross-country regressions. These studies broadly confirmed that
the strategy of inward-oriented import-substituting industrialization pur-
sued by many developing countries to varying degrees in that era was
costly in terms of foregone growth and welfare.
Fortunately, as pointed out in Section II, the virtues of outward ori-
entation have been recognized by policy makers; this fact is reflected in
that many developing countries are integrating their economies to a
greater extent than before with the world economy. The results from
globalization across countries vary significantly. In the two large devel-
oping countries of China and India, it is widely recognized that their
globalization contributed to the acceleration in their growth and a reduc-
32. See Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, I Just Ran Two Million Regressions, 87 AM. ECON.REV. 178 (1997); XAVIER X. SALA-I-MARTIN, I JUST RAN FOUR MILLION REGRESSIONS (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6252, 1997).
33. T.N. Srinivasan & Jagdish Bhagwati, Outward-Orientation and Development: Are
Revisionists Right?, in TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF ANNE 0. KRUEGER 3, 19-23 (Deepak Lal & Richard H. Snape eds., 2001).
34. See, e.g., William Brock et al., Policy Evaluation in Uncertain Economic Environ-
ments, I BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY 235 (2003). Brock and others formalize this
issue in the context of policy evaluation as "model" uncertainty, arguing that the common
practice of conditioning on a particular model is inappropriate. They suggest a procedure of
model averaging to account for model uncertainty. Since they suggest using standard Bayesian
methods to account for model uncertainty, the choice of the space of models and prior prob-




tion in poverty.35 Others see poverty and inequalities increasing, however,
because of globalization; for example, Stiglitz asserts that:
[g]lobalization today is not working for many of the world's
poor. It is not working for much of the environment. It is not
working for the stability of the global economy. The transition
from communism to a market economy has been so badly man-
aged that, with the exception of China, Vietnam, and a few
Eastern European countries, poverty has soared as incomes have
plummeted.... [Because of globalization, millions of people]
have actually been made worse off, as they have seen their jobs
destroyed and their lives become more insecure. They have felt
increasingly powerless against forces beyond their control. They
have seen their democracies undermined, their 
cultures eroded.3
6
The divergent outcomes across countries of the response to globalization
are best understood once it is recognized that globalization is just an
enabling policy. It removes or reduces barriers to transactions across
national borders, and thus opens up opportunities that may not have ex-
isted before. Whether these opportunities are availed of so that benefits
flow depends on, inter alia, whether resources move at low costs to the
activities that have become profitable and away from those that have be-
come less profitable after the opening. The poor functioning of domestic
institutions and other constraints could prevent or increase the cost of
resource movements (see Section IV) and even make globalization wel-
fare worsening. This is not an argument against globalization, but rather
only an argument for reform of domestic institutions.
B. Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
and Reform of the WTO
The importance, even the necessity, of domestic reforms for reaping
the benefits of globalization does not in any way dilute the need for ef-
forts to increase the access of developing countries to industrial country
markets and the effectiveness of their participation in the decision- and
rule-making processes of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Indeed,
the urgency of concluding the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions and, in particular, removing the distortions in global agricultural
markets created by industry country policies of export subsidy and do-
mestic support cannot be underestimated.
35. T.N. SRINIVASAN & SURESH TENDULKAR, REINTEGRATING INDIA WITH THE WORLD
ECONOMY (2003); T.N. Srinivasan, Economic Reforms and Global Integration, in THE INDIA-
CHINA RELATIONSHIP 219, 219-66 (Francine R. Frankel & Harry Harding eds., 2004).
36. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 214, 248 (2002).
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I have argued elsewhere that the WTO's scope and mandate has to be
strictly confined to trade in goods and services.37 The impeccable logic
of Jan Tinbergen, that one needs as many policy instruments as policy
objectives and that using a single instrument to achieve more than one
objective is a prescription for achieving none of them efficiently, applies
to institutional design as well.38 Using a single organization as an
instrument for designing and enforcing rules governing trade in goods
and services, intellectual property protection, environmental protection,
observance of human rights including labor standards, investment, and
competition is utterly inappropriate. 39 By the same token, the WTO is ill-
suited to serve as an instrument for promoting economic development of
less-developed countries, a task far more complex than trade, even
though its liberal trading system is very important for development. For
this reason, calling the Doha Round a development round creates
unrealistic expectations.
There are already other institutions such as the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), the International Labour Organization
(ILO), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), to
mention only a few, that could be utilized with appropriate strengthening
of their enforcement capability to achieve several of the above objec-
tives. Fortunately, thus far the trade ministers who are the ultimate
decision makers in the WTO have recognized the ILO as the appropriate
organization for labor standards and have firmly resisted the demands
from industrialized countries to bring labor standards into the WTO.
Once they resume the Doha Round of negotiations, the ministers should
decide not to consider labor standards ever again in the WTO. Although
Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) is al-
ready in the WTO, and there is a committee on Trade and Environment
in the WTO as well, there is no reason why the ministers could not de-
cide to take TRIPS out of the WTO permanently and leave intellectual
property issues for the WIPO. 4° Arguing against taking TRIPS out of the
WTO based on WIPO's enforcement mechanism being weak in com-
parison to the WTO's is a non-argument: the members of WIPO,
specifically the industrialized countries so keen on protecting their IPR,
could simply strengthen WIPO's dispute settlement mechanism. Like-
wise, they should terminate the committee on Trade and Environment
37. T.N. Srinivasan, Comment, The World Trade Organization: Should We Retool or
Restructure?, in THE BRETTON WOODS COMMITTEE CRITICAL ISSUES FORUM 9 (2003).
38. See JAN TINBERGEN, ECONOMIC POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND DESIGN 53-58 (1956).
39. There is ample evidence that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
have become less effective as they drifted from their original mandates into other areas in
which they had no competence.
40. I discuss TRIPS in the next section of this article.
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and leave environmental issues to UNEP.4' Last, the issues of investment
and competition (two of the so-called "Singapore issues") re!ate largely
to domestic regulatory policies; the case for developing international
disciplines through multilateral agreements binding on all members of
the WTO is simply not strong. The two should be taken out of multilat-
eral negotiating agenda while the possibility of plurilateral agreements
among a subset of members should be left open.
1. Intellectual Property and the WTO
Turning to intellectual property, implicit in the term "intellectual
property rights" (IPR) is the notion that there is a property value to intel-
lectual contributions and a party to whom the rights to that property
value accrue. The literature on IPR distinguishes three different perspec-
tives on this issue. At one extreme is the communitarian perspective on
intellectual property: although the inventor might claim novelty for her
contribution, she draws upon the contributions of millions of others in
making her own.4'2 There is thus no genuinely novel, individually attrib-
utable, creative activity and so there is no such thing as intellectual
property that could be given protection. At the other extreme is the natu-
ral rights view: whatever an inventor creates is her own property, she is
the sole judge of how that property is to be used, and the State in particu-
lar does not have any right to interfere with her exercise of the right she
has on her property.
Most IPR regimes do not take either of these extreme views but
rather opt for a third choice, a utilitarian perspective. Protection for intel-
lectual property is to be provided because inventive activity has broader
public utility that goes beyond the benefits that accrue to the private in-
ventor. The U.S. Constitution recognizes this in allowing that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power... [t]o Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
4 3 For this
reason, although there are costs to protecting intellectual property
through patent rights, these costs do not outweigh the benefits to the so-
ciety. In the absence of protection, according to the utilitarian
perspective, some innovation that is beneficial to society would not take
place.
41. Of course, the decisions of each of the various institutions have to be coordinated
with those of the others so that they reinforce, rather than detract, from achieving the objec-
tives of all.
42. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the
New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. R. 453,453-60 (2001).
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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The grant of a patent gives a monopoly right to the patentee for a
specified period of time over the fruits of the innovation. The patentee
could, however, exercise the monopoly right to charge a price of the
product over and above its marginal cost, thereby imposing a loss on the
users of the product. Unless the profits from a successful innovation are
large enough to compensate for the cost incurred on research, however,
including both productive research and that research which does not lead
to a product that can be successfully marketed, incentives for innovation
would be blunted. The utilitarian perspective balances the loss to users
arising from the grant of monopoly rights to the patentee against the
benefit to society from encouraging innovation. In U.S. legal practice, as
well as in the definition of the patent legislation, there is a clear under-
standing that the possible monopoly loss from giving a patent could be
significant. For instance the patentee is prevented by legislation from
extending his patent rights forward to other markets where there is no
patent protection per se. For example, Kodak had arguably a monopoly
on its copier parts. It allegedly tried to extend its monopoly to the copier
service industry by refusing to sell parts of its copier to anyone who was
not a Kodak authorized service provider. In the ensuing trial in the Dis-
trict Court of the case brought against Kodak by a service provider, the
jury unanimously held that Kodak had a parts monopoly and it levered
its parts monopoly to monopolize service. Such levering violated anti-
trust laws. Kodak was held liable for damages, and the court issued a 10-
year injunction requiring Kodak to sell parts to the service provider at
non-discriminatory prices. Kodak appealed against this to the Ninth Cir-
cuit and lost."
There is very limited empirical evidence on the utilitarian perspec-
tive's fundamental assumption that granting patents encourages
innovation. Sakakibara and Branstetter have suggested that patenting and
patent protection through granting monopoly rights do not seem to be
associated with significant increases in innovative activity, except possi-
bly in pharmaceuticals. Even if strong protection of IPR promotes
innovation, however, there is absolutely no evidence suggesting that a
44. Image Technical Service, Inc., et al. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1997-2 Trade Case.
(CCH) 71,908, (9th Cir. 1997).
45. Lee Branstetter & Mariko Sakakibara, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innova-
tion? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND J. OF ECON. 77, 77-
100 (2001). See also Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation
and the Innovation Process, 29 REs. POL'Y 531, 531-57 (2000) (concluding that "despite the
significance of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to patent-
ing, robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of
changes in patent policy are few" and that this dearth confirms "what we thought we already
knew, which is that patents are not central to appropriating the returns to R&D in most indus-
tries").
[Vol. 26:63
uniform patent life of twenty years for all innovations, regardless of
whether they relate to a new mousetrap or a lifesaving drug, is socially
optimal. In spite of this dearth of evidence, this uniform patent life is
what the agreement TRIPS in the WTO requires.
Prior to the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations,
intellectual property was not part of the GATT. IPR was under the juris-
diction of the WIPO. Pressure from the American pharmaceutical
companies resulted in TRIPS being introduced into the negotiating
agenda of the UR in the first place.46 India opposed it and conceded only
at the last minute. TRIPS was included in the negotiating agenda, even
though there were other means of protecting IP, primarily because
American companies thought that, by putting it in the WTO so as to have
access the WTO's strengthened dispute settlement mechanism, they
would have a much heavier stick with which to beat alleged violators of
patent rights. The whole IPR issue within the WTO thus centers on the
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM).
Under GATIT Articles XXII and XXIII, the DSM was a political
process that in effect encouraged both the defendant and plaintiff even-
tually to compromise. 47 The system worked reasonably well.
48 The
WTO's DSM, in contrast, is an adversarial legal process in which poor
46. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Pub-
lic Health Crises: Responding to USTR-State-Industry Positions That Undermine the WTO,
and T. N. Srinivasan, The TRIPS Agreement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 311, 316 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy &
James D. Southwich eds., 2002). Before the conclusion of the UR, the United States fre-
quently threatened to use "Special 301" provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1988 against
countries whose intellectual property regimes it judged weak. Brazil and India were two coun-
tries that were put on the "watch list" for possible sanctions under these provisions.
Developing countries acquiesced to TRIPS in large part to forestall such unilateral actions by
the United States. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Ad-
dress Public Health Crises: Responding to USTR-State-Industry Positions That Undermine the
WTO, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ROBERT E. HUDEC 316. Dam, in a private communication to the author, points out that TRIPS
was also heavily supported by the software, motion picture, and recording industries. Email
from Kenneth Dam (May 22, 2004) (on file with the author). For a history of TRIPS, in par-
ticular the roles of CEOs of Pfizer (Pratt) and IBM (Opel), who happened to have been
roommates in college, in formulating the TRIPS approach to [PR, see KENNETH DAM, THE
RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME: A NEW LOOK AT U.S. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY-
MAKING 260-61 (2001). Dam believes that controversies surrounding TRIPS are largely due to
pricing issues relating to AIDS and other lifesaving drugs and the desire of some countries to
protect their generic industries. Even if Dam is right, the issue still remains of the social cost
effectiveness of the grant of monopoly rights through patents of uniform life, regardless of the
nature of innovation in providing incentives for innovation.
47. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, arts. XXII-XXIII, 61
Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal.e/gatt47 02e.htm [hereinafter GATT].
48. Robert Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the
First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999).
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countries are at a disadvantage because they cannot afford to hire expen-
sive legal consultants. Additionally, the Appellate Body (AB) of the
WTO's DSM is very powerful: its decisions can be reversed only by the
unanimous vote of WTO members. There is already some disturbing
evidence of judicial overreach by the AB and its usurping of the exclu-
sive rule-making powers of the members of the WTO. In the Shrimp-
Turtle case brought by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand against
the United States regarding the U.S. prohibition of imports of shrimp
harvested with technology that may adversely affect certain sea turtles,
the WTO panel had held that the import embargo was inconsistent with
GATT Article XI (which limits the use of import prohibitions or restric-
tions) and could not be justified under Article XX. The Appellate Body
overruled the Panel and found that the embargo did qualify under Article
XX (9) (which deals with general exceptions to the rules, including for
certain environmental reasons) but failed to meet the requirements of the
chapeau (introductory paragraph) of the Article; i.e., the United States
violated the non-discriminatory application (of the embargo measure)
requirement of the chapeau. The Appellate Body, in overruling the panel,
may have interpreted Article XX (9) more broadly than the text would
warrant and what the signatories had intended it to mean.
In the domestic arena, if a decision of a country's highest court is not
socially acceptable, there is a legislative means of amendment of laws to
remove the disability identified by the court. In contrast to the domestic
arena, there is no such legislature in the WTO, and although the Appel-
late Body's decision theoretically can be reversed, in practice it is not
possible to mobilize a consensus of WTO members to do so. Ordinarily
a rule-based legal system of settling disputes such as the DSM is in the
interest of its weak developing country members if the strong industrial
country members comply with the rulings of the system, as they have
been doing thus far. Still, it is too soon to tell whether replacing the
GATT political process, which favored the powerful, with a costly legal
process of the WTO, which the weak can ill afford, is necessarily an im-
provement.
GATT Article XXIV relating to preferential trade agreements such
as customs unions and free trade areas has been an utter failure.49 Since
49. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ANNUAL REPORT 2004 69, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/anrep-e/anrep04_e.pdf ("The Committee on Re-
gional Trade Agreements (CRTA), the body entrusted with verifying the compliance of RTAs
with the relevant WTO provisions, continued its examination of RTAs in 2003[, making] no
further progress on its mandate of consistency assessment, due to long-standing institutional,
political, and legal difficulties. Since the established of the VWTO, Members have been unable
to reach consensus on the format, and the substance, of the reports on any of the examinations
entrusted to the CRTA.").
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such agreements are proliferating and are not necessarily in the best in-
terests of developing countries, it is essential to replace article XXIV by
the simple requirement that any proposed Preferential Trade Agreement
(PTA) be notified to the WTO, and any trade preferences that its mem-
bers grant to each other be extended to all other members of the WTO on
a most favored nation basis within a specified period (say, five years) of
the coming into force of the PTA. This way, members of the WTO would
be free to enter into a PTA and reap its non-trade benefits, if any, while
limiting the potential damage to non-members of the PTA from the trade
preferences that the members of the PTA grant to themselves. Last, anti-
dumping measures, which have no economic rationale but rather are the
equivalent of weapons of mass destruction in the armory of trade policy
instruments, should be eliminated from the list of allowable policy in-
struments in the WTO.
2. Reform of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund °
Besides reform of the WTO, the reform of the World Bank and the
IMF, the two other international institutions that interact with developing
countries, for good or for ill, is important. The World Bank is overex-
tended and ineffective. For example, there is no rationale for its lending
to, and having field offices in, countries which have easy access to world
capital markets already (e.g., China and Brazil) or would have such ac-
cess were they to enact the needed domestic reforms, particularly in the
financial sector (e.g., India and Argentina). A far smaller bank that pro-
vides technical advice and resources to countries with a leadership
credibly committed to development but with a limited domestic capabil-
ity for economic management would serve the needs of development
better.
The IMF has strayed far beyond its original mandate and has been
mired in structural adjustment lending and in poverty alleviation, besides
becoming a debt collection agency for imprudent private lenders. It
should return to its original mandate and provide macroeconomic policy
50. The IMF, the World Bank, and the VTO are intergovernmental organizations. Con-
cerns have been expressed about their "unrepresentativeness" and their "democracy deficits,"
whatever those terms mean. Demands that civil society ought to have a say in their decision
making have already been met in various ways. For example, although disputes that are
brought to the DSM of the WTO are, by definition, between states, the AB has begun to accept
amicus briefs from parties which are not states. Whether the legitimate concerns about the
accountability of intergovernmental organizations and the transparency of their decision-
making processes are best addressed by ad hoc involvement of civil society representatives is
an open question, especially since it is often unclear whose interests the civil society represen-
tatives represent. See, e.g., Joseph Nye Jr., Globalization's Democratic Deficit: How to Make
International Institutions More Accountable, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2-6 (Jul./Aug. 2001).
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advice through its Article 4 surveillance mechanism and concern itself
mainly with ensuring the stability of the global monetary system.'
Whether for doing so it has to become a lender of last resort with more
resources at its command is arguable.
3. Development Assistance
It is evident that the volume of private capital flows far exceed de-
velopment assistance. It is true that private flows are confined to a few
emerging market countries, but others could join their ranks once their
domestic reforms are complete. Still, for a number of developing coun-
tries (particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa) development assistance will
continue to be important. The evidence from HIPC (Highly Indebted
Poor Countries) initiatives, however, suggest that conditionalities associ-
ated with debt relief and development assistance do not always work.
After all, funds are fungible, and restricting the use of a part of the total
resources available to a government cannot ensure that its overall spend-
ing is development oriented.
4. Worrying Actions by the United States
and European Union
Last, and most importantly, the United States and the European Un-
ion by their recent actions have not helped the process of globalization
and the adoption of the rule of law in developing countries. One example
is the plethora of thoughtless legislative actions at the federal and state
levels prohibiting "outsourcing" without any serious analysis of its over-
all impact on the U.S. economy.12 A second example is what is widely
perceived as a climb down by the United States in order to appease the
European Union in the negotiations for liberalizing agricultural trade, an
issue of great concern to developing countries. In July, 2002, the United
States had offered a far-reaching set of proposals for substantially reduc-
ing, and eventually eliminating by an agreed future date, all domestic
support measures, immediately eliminating export subsidies altogether,
and considerably reducing import tariffs. Had the proposals been
adopted, the complex classification system of domestic support so sus-
ceptible to abuse would have been abolished. This system, adopted as
51. The success of the surveillance mechanism, just as that of the DSM of the WTO,
depends crucially on the willingness of the strong as well as the weak to consider the advice
of the IMF seriously and act on it. For example, the United States has not paid much attention
to IMF's views on its macroeconomic policy.
52. At least 35 states have introduced more than 100 bills to curb or ban offshore out-
sourcing, and legislation on the issue has also proliferated at the federal level. See SHANNON
KLINGER & M. LYNN SYKES, EXPORTING THE LAW: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF STATE AND FED-
ERAL OUTSOURCING LEGISLATION (2004), available at http://www.nfap.net.
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part of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, 53 classified do-
mestic support measures into green and blue boxes, the expenditure on
which there were no limitations, and an amber box on which there were
limitations on expenditure that varied across countries with no necessary
relation to the importance of agriculture in their economies.
While these proposals received support from developing countries
and agricultural exporters, the European Union vehemently attacked
them for going too far and for being hypocritical in light of the May,
2002 passage of a U.S. farm bill authorizing additional spending of over
$120 billion in various domestic support measures. Although the United
States claimed that even after the implementation of the bill U.S. expen-
ditures on domestic support will not exceed the ceiling set up in the
agreement on agriculture in the Uruguay Round, this claim was uncon-
vincing. In any case, in August, 2003, a month before the ministerial
meeting of the WTO in Canctin, the United States and European Union
came up with a joint set of proposals which amounted to far less liberali-
zation of agricultural trade than the proposals of July, 2002 intended. In
particular, the proposals did not abolish the complex boxes system, and
although the proposals included reduction of trade-distorting support
measures by unspecified percentages, they did not set a date for the
elimination of those measures, nor did they propose immediate elimina-
tion of export subsidies.54 This set of proposals drew strong opposition
from developing countries and contributed to the collapse of the Cancrn
Ministerial meeting.
A third example is the reluctance to deal in a substantive way with
tariff escalation (import tariffs rising with the degree of processing, such
that unprocessed raw products attract the lowest tariff) and tariff peaks
(tariffs on specific products that far exceed average tariffs) that signifi-
cantly discriminate against exports from developing countries. The
longstanding ambivalence of the United States with respect to interna-
tional judicial institutions does not help the cause of rule of law. Most
recently, for example, the United States declined to sign on to the juris-
diction of the newly established International Criminal Court. Earlier,
the United States had withdrawn from the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice after the Court's ruling against the United
States in the case brought by Nicaragua in 1986. Even in the case of
WTO's DSM, the then-Senator Robert Dole had proposed establishing a
53. GATT, supra note 47; see Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
54. Fortunately, in mid-2004 both the United States and European Union have proposed
to eliminate them. See WTO, THE JULY 2004 PACKAGE, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dda.e/dda-packagejuly04_e.htm.
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WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission made up of federal
judges that would review final WTO decisions adverse to the United
States. The proposed commission would review whether the panel or Ap-
pellate Body of the WTO's DSM had acted improperly. If the commission
made three affirmative decisions in any five-year period, any member of
the U.S. Congress could initiate an expedited legislative procedure leading
to the withdrawal of the United States from the WTO. 5  Although the
Dole proposal was fortunately not adopted by Congress, the still-present
threat of a possible U.S. withdrawal cannot but influence the decisions of
WTO's dispute settlement bodies.
IV. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS
A. Some General Considerations
Sen examines:
[s]ocietal arrangements, involving many institutions (the state,
the market, the legal system, political parties, the media, public
interest groups, and public discussion forums, among others) are
investigated in terms of their contribution to enhancing and
guaranteeing the substantive freedoms of individuals, seen as ac-
tive agents of change, rather than as passive recipients of
dispensed benefits. 56
Almost all of the institutions mentioned by Sen are domestic, and, as
such, any policy for improving their functioning towards enhancing
freedoms has to be domestic. By the same token, domestic pressure for
adoption of particular domestic policies in response to external pressures
such as aid conditionality is unlikely to be sustained unless there is a
broad domestic political support for those domestic policies. These do-
mestic policies are essential for growth, as domestic institutions can
offset the contributions of liberalization to growth by limiting labor mar-
55. The European Union filed a complaint in 1996 against the U.S. Helms-Burton Act,
under which non-U.S. companies could be sued by private parties in U.S. courts for "traffick-
ing" in those assets confiscated by the Cuban government from those private parties, for the
Act's extraterritorial reach. Before a panel was appointed to consider the dispute, the Euro-
pean Union asked for its postponement by a week in order to reach a compromise with the
United States on settling it. This effort failed, and a panel was appointed. Just hours after the
appointment of the panel, the United States announced that "it would refuse to take part in the
legal proceedings. It declared that the newly-created body [W'TO], which was intended to be
the arbiter of World Trade Rules, 'has no competence to proceed in an issue of American na-
tional security.'" N.Y TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at Al.
56. SEN, supra note 9, at xii-xiii.
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ket flexibility, segmenting internal markets, and failing to provide the
necessary economic and social infrastructure.
The traditional argument about static factor price effects and gains
from trade, for example, assumes that resources move smoothly and
costlessly from import-competing to exporting activities. Obviously, if
resources cannot or do not move, exporting industries will not expand,
while import-competing industries will surely contract because of in-
creased competition from imports after trade liberalization, resulting in
unemployment. This somewhat extreme but elementary argument has
been raised by Stiglitz against trade liberalization when he says that "[i]t
is easy to destroy jobs, and this is often the immediate impact of trade
liberalization, as the inefficient industries [those created under the pro-
tectionist walls] close down under pressure from international
competition."57 Because he assumes that no new, more efficient jobs
would be created, Stiglitz concludes that "moving resources from low-
productivity uses [in inefficient industries] to zero productivity [unem-
ployment] does not enrich a country ... " While true, keeping factors in
less-productive uses forever does not enrich a country, either.
This is not to say that there is no rationale for phasing in trade liber-
alization over a period of time, but only that it does not mean postponing
it forever. In fact, committing credibly to a phased program while at the
same time removing domestic impediments would be the appropriate
policy.58 If the phasing-in period is too long, however, the commitment to
liberalize will not be credible; to decide the length of the phase-in pe-
riod, the possible loss of credibility must be balanced against the benefits
of easing the costs of adjustment to liberalization.
Globalization's effect on short-term growth also depends upon the
exact forms of globalization and pre-existing market distortions. Remov-
ing barriers and controls on financial capital flows, for example, may
improve resource allocation and give more people access to better-
functioning credit markets in the long run. In the short term, on the other
hand, it can lead to crisis and lower growth in countries with fragile do-
mestic financial sectors. Those regions (and individuals) which are better
placed initially to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by re-
forms (or, for that matter, by any other factor, such as, e.g., the
information-technology revolution) are naturally likely to grow faster
(and richer). For example, India's phenomenal success in software is still
57. STIGLITZ, supra note 36, at 59.
58. P. C. Mahanalobis also proposed the creation of a Labour Reserve, into which laid
off or retrenched workers would be placed; the Reserve would pay them a modest allowance
and train them for reemployment elsewhere in the economy. P.C. Mahanalobis, The Asian
Drama: An Indian View, SANKHYA, THE J. OF STAT., Series B., Vol. 31, Parts 3 & 4 (Dec.
1969).
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confined to a few cities in the south and west. The real issue is not one of
increasing regional disparities but of whether the socio-economic system
would enable the initially disadvantaged regions and individuals to catch
up. If it does not, the social and political consequences could be serious
and could lead to secessionist threats.59
Needless to say, in the developing world, market distortions are
ubiquitous, and their impact on the extent and depth of poverty are often
serious. Whether an individual (or a household) has adequate resources
to purchase enough of the relevant goods and services so as not to be
deemed poor (the "poverty bundle") at the relevant prices at a point in
time depends, of course, on what she (or her household) can earn from
her assets (land, financial capital, and physical capital) and, most impor-
tantly, from her labor (allowing for skills and educational attainments).
The functioning of asset and labor markets, as well as product markets
for goods and services bought or sold, obviously influences the earnings
from assets and their purchasing power.6° The chief asset of the poor is
their labor; thus, raising productivity to create a sustained increase in
real returns to labor in wage and self-employment would contribute sig-
nificantly to poverty alleviation. Domestic public policy has a large role
to play in reducing poverty: increasing the human capital endowments of
the poor, perhaps by providing incentives for investment in human capi-
tal or through public expenditure on (and improved access of the poor
to) public education and health care programs, raises the productivity of
their labor.
Globalization also contributes to this goal in several ways. First, the
growth associated with globalization will generally create an outward
shift in the demand for wage labor and for goods and services produced
by the self-employed. Second, returns to the abundant factor, which in
most poor countries is unskilled labor, would rise with trade liberaliza-
tion.6' While multinational companies naturally take advantage of the
less-developed country's abundance of unskilled workers to pay less than
they would pay similar workers in their home countries, these wages are
often higher than the wages paid by domestic companies in the host
59. The defeat of the ruling National Democratic Alliance in the general elections of
April-May, 2004 in India has been attributed by some to be impatience of the large rural
population to wait for benefits of reforms and globalization to reach them.
60. Clearly if there are no distortions in all these markets and all individuals and house-
holds face the same prices, the extent of poverty would be determined by the distribution of
assets and labor in the economy.
61. There are, empirically, important exceptions to this general theoretical expectation.
See, e.g., Ann E. Harrison & Gordon Hanson, Who Gains from Trade Reform? Some Remain-
ing Puzzles, 48 J. DEV. EcON. 419, 419-47 (1999) (presenting evidence that trade openness in
several Latin American and Asian countries has been associated with an increased return to
skilled labor relative to unskilled labor).
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countries. Third, more-integrated labor markets are important to ensure
that workers receive the best return for their work.62 This last aspect of
globalization has not yet been realized; in fact, national integration is
still limited by poor infrastructure, explicit restriction on movement (as
in China), and linguistic differences across regions. Unlike commodities,
the cost of whose movement within and between countries is primarily
determined by costs of transportation and insurance, the cost of mobility
of labor involves social and legal barriers as well as economic ones.
B. Legal Reforms in India
Legal reforms is currently a hot topic in India.63 The Federation of
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and India held a
national conference on April 10, 2004, in New Delhi on "Reinventing
Indian Legal System for Achieving Double Digit Economic Growth." In
the campaign for the parliamentary elections recently concluded in May,
2004, the election manifestos of major political parties all included legal
reforms. The Indian National Congress (INC), which won the largest
number of seats and is forming the government, promised that:
[i]mmediate measures will be taken to drastically cut delays in
courts, particularly in the High Courts and in lower levels of the
judiciary. Legal aid services will be aided. Alternative dispute
settlement mechanisms will be strengthened. A new system of
nyaya panchavats will be instituted.
The Congress will tackle the root causes of corruption and the
generation of black money. To a large extent, deregulation, re-
moval of laws that have outlived their utility or have not fulfilled
62. Wage labor market policies are obviously not a solution for all of poverty. Only a
small part of the labor force in many developing countries (less than 20% in India and South
Asia, for example) is in formal wage and salary employment. An overwhelming majority of
the labor force is in self-employment (often in subsistence farming, in handicraft activities,
and in household-based production for local markets). For them it is not so much the function-
ing of labor markets but that of product and credit markets that is more relevant. See generally
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION OF LABOUR (2002).
63. Concern with legal reforms is not new. Since the third decade of the 19th century,
law commissions were constituted by the government from time to time and were empowered
to recommend legislative reforms. The first such commission was established in 1834, and the
second, the third, and the fourth law commissions were constituted in 1853, 1861 and 1879,
respectively. In 1925, a Civil Justice Committee appointed by the government submitted its
report. In the post-independence period, seventeen Law Commissions have been constituted,
with the seventeenth having been constituted with effect from September 1, 2003. It has a
three-year term. Its terms of reference include various aspects of legal reforms. The
seventeen law commissions have thus far issued 191 reports in all, available at
www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in.
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their social purpose, transparency in party financing, and state
funding of elections will help. Even so, the Congress is con-
scious of the havoc that corruption at all levels adds to the
harassment of the common man and is determined to rid the
country of this scourge.64
The Communist Party of India (Marxist), which is supporting the
INC government, included the following in its judicial reform proposals:
• Reforms in judicial system to provide speedy relief at afford-
able cost to the common people;
" Constituting a National Judicial Commission comprising of
representatives from judiciary, executive, legislature and bar
for appointment, transfer of judges and to ensure judicial ac-
countability;
" There should be a proper balance in the relations between the
legislature, judiciary and the executive and the exercise of
powers in their respective spheres without encroaching into
61the legitimate domain of other organs.
The defeated coalition, The National Democratic Alliance, at the
center proposed the following:
" A Rs. 1,000 core (roughly $2 billion) Fund for Modernization
of Courts will be set up to improve the physical and opera-
tional infrastructure of courts. This will receive partial
contribution from the legal community. Judicial officers will
be empowered to involve the community in improving the fa-
cilities in a transparent manner.
• The number of courts and the number of judges will be dou-
bled in five years for quicker judicial process.
* A separate class of courts will be set up for cases involving
specified commercial laws such as the Contract Act, Negotia-
ble Instruments Act, and other business laws. These would
deliver quicker justice to aggrieved businesses, and would be
partly funded by charging both litigants a "Fast Track" fee.
• Reform of the criminal justice system to make dispensation of
justice simpler, quicker, and more effective.
64. INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, LOK SABHA ELECTIONS 2004: MANIFESTO OF THE
INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (2004), available at http://www.aicc.org.in/manifesto-2004.htm.
65. COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST), MANIFESTO FOR THE 14TH LOK SABHA
ELECTIONS (2004), available at http://cpim.org/elections/20041s/03162004_141s-manifesto.pdf.
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* Courts all over the country will be computerized and net-
worked for improving their efficiency.
" Extension of Fast-Track Courts to all layers of the judiciary.
" Expansion of alternative dispute redressal mechanisms
through Lok Adalats and Tribunals.
" Setting up a National Judicial Commission for appointment of
judges and ensuring judicial ethics.
* A Judicial Procedural Reforms Committee will suggest,
within six months, how to halve the time taken to conduct
every trial, civil or criminal. The aim would be to ensure that
three-fourths of all court cases are completed in twelve
months.
" The number of cases in which the Government is a litigant
will be halved in the next three years.&
The president of FICCI in his welcome address to the conference de-
scribed the problems and their outcomes as follows:
We all know that Companies today have to maintain a huge de-
partment and incur major expenses to ensure compliance of
innumerable laws. As you know, because of the complicated
system, this compliance is not easy and often these laws push
companies into avoidable litigations, sometimes over trivia. It is
not unreasonable to assume that at any given point of time some
of our companies are embroiled in a number of legal cases,
which carry on not only for years but for decades.
The net result is:
The huge unnecessary legal cost adds to cost of operations
just when companies are struggling to reduce costs to meet
the threat of global competition.
New projects and expansion plans particularly in green field
areas are delayed because of numerous laws and compliance
requirements. This slows down the process of investment,
which indeed should be the key objective if we want to
achieve a 10% growth rate.
66. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, AN AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT, GOOD Gov-
ERNANCE, PEACE, AND HARMONY (2004), available at http://www.indian-elections.com/
partymanifestoes/nda.html.
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The confidence of foreign investors in India's business envi-
ronment suffers because of the delay in delivering justice
despite of the fact that India has one of the fairest judicial sys-
tems in the world.
He made the following five reform proposals:
First-There should be a Sunset Clause in all Legislations,
Rules and Laws-The Government must review the relevance of
such legislations after the expiry of time period in the Sunset
Clause.
Second-There should be a mandatory provision in the law to
provide that no frivolous appeal from Government would be
filed. A method to ascertain must be developed and the Ministry
of Law and Justice could play a pivotal role.
Third-The existing Court procedures and systems must be ra-
tionalized and simplified to facilitate speedy disposal of cases.
Fourth-The concept of plea-bargaining, as prevalent in the
United States should be introduced.
Fifth-To reduce the burden on Courts, more and more cases
should be referred to Institutional Arbitration.
The interest in judicial reforms across the political spectrum from
the extreme left to the religious right is somewhat surprising. In fact, the
election manifestos seem to take it for granted that reforms are needed as
they do not spell out why. On the surface, the proposed reforms by all
parties and FICCI have several common elements, such as reducing de-
lays, bypassing the regular courts through the creation of special courts
and tribunals and other fora for alternative dispute settlement mecha-
nisms, creation of a judicial commission for appointment and transfer of
judges, and so on.67 It is also evident that the wish to accelerate and
deepen India's globalization process, which in large part means removal
of domestic constraints that add avoidable costs and make Indian prod-
ucts less competitive in world markets, is also behind the push for
67. There is a literature on various ADMs in India. See ROBERT MOOG, DEMOCRATIZA-
TION OF JUSTICE: THE INDIAN EXPERIMENT WITH CONSUMER FORUMS (Stanford University
Center for Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform Working Paper No. 141,
2002). Moog's own evaluation of one ADM, namely the Consumer Fora established under the
Consumer Protection Act of 1986, is sobering. While rightly emphasizing that data available
are too limited to draw firm conclusions, he finds that these fora have not substantially re-
duced the burden on civil courts. On the quality of justice, as measured by three criteria of
community empowerment, party participation and access to justice, only one, namely access,
has increased with the creation of the fora. Despite this weakness, Moog concludes nonethe-
less that this experiment with ADMs is worth continuing. Id.
[Vol. 26:63
Development
reforms.68 This is clearly seen from the proposals of FICCI but also in
the election manifestos. This being said, the reform proposals seem su-
perficial and are focused on the symptoms rather than deeper causes 69 not
only of the inefficiency and high cost of system in its delivery of judicial
service, but even more importantly of the deleterious distributional and
economic development consequences of the judgments rendered. The
failure to identify the root causes and also the specific laws that con-
strain economic growth (e.g., labor and bankruptcy laws) is
understandable. No political party would wish to identify and thus of-
fend special interests that would be adversely affected were such laws to
be amended or repealed. Legal reform encompasses both law reform
(i.e., changes in laws) and judicial reform (i.e., reform of procedural as-
pects of the legal system). A similar distinction has been made by Jensen
and Heller,70 who, according to Moog,7 1 identify three levels of reform:
changes in substantive law; reform of law-related institutions; and gov-
ernment compliance with the law. All reform proposals in India seem to
concentrate on procedural aspects, however, and pay little attention to
law reform. The latter probably is equally, if not more, urgent than judi-
cial reform.
There are several reasons why law reform is urgent in India.72 First,
because of India's common law tradition, not all laws are statutory,
68. M. NELSON, EFFICIENCY, ECONOMIC REFORM, AND THE ROLE OF ENABLING INSTI-
TUTIONS TO INDIA: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE COURTS 3 (2003) (arguing that in practice, courts
in India do not "accelerate" the process of economic reform. Instead, they intervene to "ame-
liorate" its most destabilizing effects). In his view,
the value of the courts may lie in their ability to encourage a more effective-and
sustainable-pattem of extrajudicial negotiation and compromise, one in which the
defenders of the status quo settle for less than advocates of reform might expect...
but more than they would have if the reforms had never emerged at all.
Id. at 39. For an analysis of the functioning of Indian civil courts from a perspective of interac-
tion among self-interested principal actors within them who attempt to ensure that their
interests are served through the use of all the powers they command, see ROBERT MOOG,
WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SUPREME? ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CIVIL COURTS IN IN-
DIA 33-134 (1997).
69. Robert Moog suggested to me that the underlying causes reside in the legal culture,
particularly in the attitudes and behaviour patterns of the bench, bar, and other relevant actors.
In his view, adding more judges or creating a new tribunal would not change the culture, as the
preexisting culture will inevitably permeate the courtrooms of the newly appointed judges and
tribunals. Private Communication with the Author (May 21, 2004). In a follow-up of MOOG,
supra note 67, he found that this is what happened to consumer fora where delays have be-
come a serious problem. Id.
70. Thomas Heller & Erik Jensen, Rule of Law, Governance and Judicial Reform, in
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1 (Thomas Heller & Erik Jensen eds., 2003).
71. See MOOG, supra note 67.
72. I have drawn from Bebek Debroy's, Why We Need Law Reform, available at
http://www.india-seminar.com/2001/497/497 bibek debroy.htm, in writing this section. Moog,
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although some laws have evolved through case law and then been
codified. The bulk of commercial law has been codified. There is,
however, administrative law consisting of government orders,
regulations, and rules. In principle, these have some statutory laws as
their foundation. The pursuit of a development strategy since 1950 in
which the state played a dominant role and the private sector was
controlled by administrative means rather than the fiscal system
operating through the market led to the explosion of administrative laws.
Yet the report of 1998 by the Commission on Administrative Reform
noted that the legislative department of the central government did not
have a complete compilation of rules, regulations, and procedures issued
by the central ministries, let alone those issued by state governments.
Apparently, the last time they were all collated and assembled was in
1963.
The same report pointed out there were 2,500 central statutory laws
in force when it reported. There was no estimate of all the state laws in
force, although in one state alone there were 1,100, which suggests,
given that there are now 28 states, the total number could be around
30,000 state laws ! In certain areas in the so-called Concurrent List of
the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution, both the center and the
states can legislate. These statutes are rarely published; the government
has the copyright and monopoly publication right to its works, which
include laws, and, apparently, the governments do not feel it essential to
publish the laws.
As in England, in India there is no desuetude so that once enacted a
law remains on the statute books forever. Dysfunctional statutes would
remain on the books unless repealed and could be capriciously invoked
at any time. In the context of economic reforms and globalization, the
most debilitating laws are labor and bankruptcy laws. Labor is on the
Concurrent List with some forty-five central labor laws, ranging from the
Factories Act going back to the 19th century to laws relating to Contract
Labor, Trade Unions, and the Industrial Dispute. The late Professor
Prasanta Chandra Mahanalobis, the architect of India's Planning for De-
velopment and by no means a conservative, long ago characterized
Indian labor laws as follows:
Certain welfare measures tend to be implemented in India ahead
of economic growth, for example, in labor laws which are
probably the most highly protective of labor interests in the nar-
rowest sense, in the whole world. There is practically no link
in his private communication to me, correctly points out that law reforms could run into the
same problems surrounding enforcement as court decisions.
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between output and remuneration; hiring and firing are highly
restricted. It is extremely difficult to maintain an economic level
of productivity or improve productivity .... In India with a per
capita income of only about $70, the present form of protection
of organized labor, which constitutes, including their families,
about five or six percent of the whole population, would operate
as an obstacle to growth and would also increase inequalities .
The situation has hardly changed in the four decades since he wrote. La-
bor laws have created a labor aristocracy consisting of unionized
employees of government, public sector units, state enterprises, and
large-scale private enterprises. The majority of the Indian labor force
who are self-employed are not protected by these laws.
It is worth mentioning that under the Trade Unions Act, any seven
persons can form and register a trade union, and they need not even be
workers. There are no limits on outsiders' holding office in unions, nor is
any test laid down for union representatives through secret ballots or
otherwise. This gave rise to multiplicity of unions. The multiplicity is
debilitating because, by law, an agreement with one union is not neces-
sarily binding on others. Even more debilitating is the Industrial
Disputes Act, which requires firms employing 100 workers or more to
get the permission of the government before layoffs, retrenchment, and
closure. The case law relating to retrenchment is bizarre. The courts have
deemed as retrenchment the discharge of a probationary employee at the
end of her probation; the automatic termination of a temporary employee
appointed for nine days at the end of nine days; the termination of an
employee who failed to pass a test required for confirmation; and the
termination of a worker who is repeatedly absent without permission.
Among its various features are its detailed stipulations in the Facto-
ries Act. An amusing example relates to the type, number, and location
of spittoons in a factory and the prominent display at suitable places of a
notice detailing the fines on those who spit in the factory but not in the
spittoons. The Act enables the government to make rules requiring facto-
ries to provide closets for workers' non-work garments during working
hours and a line for drying of wet clothing.
With respect to judicial reforms, the judiciary itself is an obstacle. The
single greatest obstacle to reforms, however, is the bar. Moog
74 discusses
this issue and so does the Law Commission in its 131st report. Having
held that it will have primacy in the appointment of judges, the Indian Su-
preme Court has failed to recommend appointments to fill vacancies in
73. See Mahalanobis, note 58, at 442.
74. See MOOG, supra note 67.
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time, so that currently nearly a fourth of the authorized positions of High
Court Judge is vacant. Moreover, the judiciary is reluctant to supply even
simple data to judge performance. For example, in response to a question
in Parliament, the government asked the high courts for information on
the number of judgments delayed over a year. One High Court refused
on the grounds that supplying such data is an unwarranted infringement
on its autonomy!" The reluctance to supply such information, the occa-
sional use of "contempt of court" citations to silence critics, and the non-
transparency of the procedure of enquiries into alleged misbehavior of
judges by other judges have all undoubtedly led to the belief that judicial
autonomy has been used to cover up judicial failings.
I do not intend to imply that the entire judicial system in India is cor-
rupt and self-serving, nor do I wish to underplay the vital role that the
Indian Supreme Court and the lower courts have played in upholding
individual liberty and in executive abuses. Arun Shourie, a former
World Bank economist and editor of the widely circulated daily newspa-
per Indian Express and current Minister for Privatization, points out in
his book Courts and Their Judgments:
Sitting in my own home, and watching my 89-year old father, I
get to see how much a single citizen is able to serve society
when what he sets out gets the attention of courts. The ending of
discrimination between pensioners, making manufacturers and
professionals like doctors accountable for the goods and services
they provide consumers, getting the thousand-odd blood banks
in our country as well as suppliers of intravenous fluids to ad-
here to minimal standards, getting political parties to maintain
accounts, setting up the entire structure of consumer courts
75. There are many instances where judges retire before delivering the judgment on the
cases they heard. Sometimes this action may have political calculations behind it. Arun
Shourie recounts the sad saga of a case on bonded labor and the retirement of former Chief
Justice P N. Bhagwati before delivering his judgment on it. ARUN SHOURIE, COURTS AND
THEIR JUDGMENTS: PREMISES, PREREQUISITES, CONSEQUENCES 17-18 (2001). See Nelson,
supra note 68, at 30 (citing Robin Meams as saying, "[c]ourt cases over land disputes frequently
drag on for decades.... Probably the bulk of all pending court cases ... concern land disputes,
both in civil courts and in assault of public order cases."); see also James A. Hanson & Sanjay
Kathuria, India's Financial System, Getting Ready for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction,
in INDIA: A FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR THE T\WENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (James A. Hanson &
Sanjay Kathuria eds., 1999) ("[T]he log-jam in the courts means that it takes 10-15 years to
reach a judgment against a loan defaulter, and even then collateral may not be executed").
76. The most recent example relates to the acquittal by a lower court in the state of Guja-
rat of some Hindus who were alleged to have instigated and participated in the killing of
Muslims in the gruesome riots of a few years ago. The Supreme Court not only set aside the
acquittals and ordered a retrial but also passed strictures against the behavior of local authorities.
See J. Venkatesan, Supreme Court orders re-trial in Best Bakery case, THE HINDU, Apr. 13,
2004, at Al, available at http://www.hindu.com/2004/04/13/stories/2004041306340100.htm.
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across the country, restraining the hands of politicians and the
powerful land mafia as they grab land and set up unauthorized
colonies in Delhi, drastically altering the procedure for assessing
property tax-a procedure that had become an instrument of ex-
actions by assessors, preventing a major strike by the executives
of the National Thermal Power Corporation.... In each of these
instances, by deliberating on the facts and solutions that one
solitary citizen had placed before them, the courts affected re-
form.
There is another feature, one that transcends orders of courts in
individual cases. Now that I can see things from within the Ex-
ecutive, I notice in it a healthy fear of the courts. How would the
courts react if we do X instead of Y? Has the direction of the
court been complied with in full? This overarching concern for
the likely reactions and views of the courts ensures that the im-
pact of courts far transcends the individual cases they decide: it
is a potent influence for accountability, for rule-abidingness in
the Executive.
But equally, the record shows that:
• Several rulings are far from reality, from what lies in the
realm of the practicable;
• While the courts often give sweeping directions-ones that
get bold headlines, ones that raise hope among citizens-they
do not as often follow these up to see whether the Executive
has carried them out;
• Outside the State structure there is just about as much fear of
the courts as there is of income tax among our non-salaried
class.
Without doubt, an important function of the Courts is to pro-
claim ideals before society, to stretch the Executive so that it
puts in the maximum possible effort. But it should be equally
evident that if:
* Rulings-or laws-are so far ahead of reality; or if
• Courts, having decreed a remedy, do not follow up to ensure
that it is being adhered to;
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They run the risk of compounding cynicism-about courts,
about laws, about the Rule of Law.
7
The far-from-reality rulings to which Shourie refers mostly relate to the
economic issues. In large part, they arise from the fact that the training
of lawyers in Indian law schools until recently did not include econom-
ics. The distinguished U.S. tradition of Law and Economics was
virtually absent in Indian legal training. Fortunately, this is changing.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Most of the failures in development, particularly in exploiting the
opportunities opened by globalization, can be attributed to domestic con-
straints in developing countries. Certainly, greater access to industrial
country markets and more effective participation of developing countries
in the decision-making processes of the WTO are important. The reform
of the functioning of the World Bank and the IMF are just as important.
Again, benefits from such changes to developing countries would be lim-
ited without domestic reform, including reform of the legal system.
Repeating the mantra "rule of law" and concluding from crude cross-
country regressions that variations in proxy for "rule of law" contributes
significantly to variations in growth performance across countries are of
dubious value in promoting real reform.
77. SHOURIE, supra note 75, at 14-15. Moog, in an email to the author, points out that
the Supreme Court receives as much or more respect and credibility as any other state or po-
litical institutions other than the military, and that cynicism over unenforced decisions, though
a potential danger, has not thus far tainted the Supreme Court. However, lower courts do suffer
a serious credibility problem, and perceptions of corruption, delays, failure to dispense justice,
and other factors compound the problem of those courts.
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